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Practical methods have been established in the
United States for issuing officially certified
electronic documents, including confidential
documents.1 These developments fill voids that
had previously prevented fully electronic court e-
filing systems, including official attestation
signatures. Examples of such methods include the
first digitally signed judicial order in the United
States federal court system, electronic state court
processes for completing and issuing charging
documents and domestic violence protective
orders, authorization for court clerks to issue
electronic certified records under electronic seals
of court, and secure electronic notarization
implementation. As discussed in this article,
performing official acts electronically must
include practices for creating authoritative source
records so as to permit the logical extension of
the legacy common law trust framework for
authenticating paper documents to the digital
equivalent.
At the same time, using the term “Open Government,”
President Barack Obama’s Administration has called for
government to use information technology, including
cloud computing2 and web service platforms, to
enhance services to the citizen and promote greater
citizen participation.3 On June 25, 2010, the Obama
Administration made available for public comment a
“National Strategy for Trusted Identities in
Cyberspace”.4 Both public and private sector
participants view trust in on-line access to networks, the
secure exchange of authentic information, and the
overall identity ecosystem as essential to enable greater
citizen use of government data and participation in the
digital economy data.5 In particular, for electronic
documents to be reliable over time, a persistent
document-level control and protection mechanism in
the form of a self verifiable electronic seal or
1 This paper recognizes the distinction between
certification and authentication of a document. An
authenticated document is not necessarily
certified. See, Taylor v. Commonwealth, 502 S.E.2d
113 (Va.App. 1998). (A certification involves an
official representation or attestation that a
particular act has or has not been done or that a
certain fact is true while “[a]uthentication
addresses the genuineness of a document.”).
2 CHARLES BABCOCK, MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
FOR THE CLOUD (McGraw Hill, 2010) at 4-16 and
221-225. Generally defined as non-client computer
services, including infrastructure, software
applications, platforms, and archiving maintained
by third part providers.
3 For example, see EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET
OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2010 at
158 (Feb.26, 2009) at 158, available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy10/pdf/spe
c.pdf (“Initial [cloud computing] pilots conducted
in collaboration with Federal agencies will serve as
test beds to demonstrate capabilities, including
appropriate security and privacy protection at or
exceeding current best practices, developing
standards, gathering data, and benchmarking
costs and performance.”).
4 http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/06/
25/national-strategy-trusted-identities-
cyberspace.
5 National Strategy for Trusted Identities in
Cyberspace, at 4-6 and 23.
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“trustmark” is necessary.6
Maturing methods and practices that combine
persistent document-level detective controls
(mechanism to detect alteration) and preventive
controls (mechanism to prevent alteration), applied to
electronic documents issued from trusted or
authoritative official sources, best enable contemporary
demands for open government and a digital economy
and in a manner consistent with the foundational
common law trust framework. Furthermore, these
electronic information assurance methods are well
positioned to providing the most effective techniques in
meeting evidentiary self-authentication requirements.
Common law foundations 
“Be ye ever so high, the law is above you”7
Document trust framework
An instructive record of early common law methods for
creating reliable official paper documents is contained
in Justice and Sheriff,8 a book well known to generations
of New Hampshire attorneys. Justice Bell quotes an
early nineteenth century New Hampshire law that
addresses a fundamental trust issue with paper
documents – forgery:
If any person shall falsely make or counterfeit, or
fraudulently alter any public record, any writ process
or proceeding of any court of this State; any
certificate or attestation of a justice of the peace,
notary public, clerk of any court, town clerk or other
public officer, in any matter wherein such certificate or
attestation may be received as legal proof…with intent
that any person may be defrauded, he shall be
punished by solitary imprisonment not exceeding six
months, and by confinement to hard labor not less
than three years nor more than seven years.9
The common law trust framework for official paper
documents historically has consisted of certificates,
signatures, and seals from reliable sources (i.e. judges,
sheriffs, justices of the peace, notaries public, and
constables). It is interesting to observe that the book
contains 62 references to seal usage, 48 references to
official certificates, and 42 references to signatures by
hand.10
Document authentication
Digital evidence is subject to the same admissibility
tests as paper records.11 The Federal Rules of Evidence
and the evidence rules of nearly every state provide that
“[t]the requirement of authentication or identification as
a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter
in question is what its proponent claims.”12 However, the
ephemeral nature of digital evidence and the ease with
which digital objects can be undetectably modified
make the problem of authentication much more
complex than that of paper records and consequently
even more critical in an electronic judicial system and
digital economy.13
There are two primary proof hurdles for
authenticating digital documents — authenticity (origin
and integrity) and reliability.14 Authenticity requires
proof of origin (identification of the creator or
authorized signer), content integrity (whether the
document has been altered since its creation), and the
time the assertion or attestation was made, executed,
or issued.15 A critical part of the authentication inquiry
is whether effective safeguards have been implemented
6 National Strategy for Trusted Identities in
Cyberspace, at 13-17 and 34 (“To maintain
trustmark integrity, the trustmark itself must be
resistant to tampering and forgery, participants
should be able to both visually and electronically
validate its authenticity.”).
7 GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, THE TYRANNICIDE BRIEF
(Anchor Books, 2005) at 18. Rallying cry used in
opposition to Charles I.
8 SAMUEL D. BELL, JUSTICE AND SHERIFF:
PRACTICAL FORMS (Concord, 1843).
9 SAMUEL D. BELL, JUSTICE AND SHERIFF:
PRACTICAL FORMS (Concord, 1843) at 418.
10 For an analysis of the effect of custom and
experience on the development of the substantive
framework of common law practices and theories,
see FREDERIC R. KELLOGG, OLIVER WENDALL
HOLMES, JR., LEGAL THEORY AND JUDICIAL
RESTRAINT (Cambridge University Press, 2007) at
46-60.
11 Paul W. Grimm, Michael V. Ziccardi and Alexander
W. Major, Back to the Future: Lorraine v. Markel
American Insurance Co. and New Findings on the
Admissibility of Electronically Stored Information,
42 Akron L. Rev. 357 (2009) at 362.
12 FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
13 STEPHEN MASON, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 2nd edn, 2010) at §
2.04. See also PAUL, FOUNDATIONS OF DIGITAL
EVIDENCE (American Bar Association, 2008) at 21.
14 MASON, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE, at §§ 4.08, 4.10,
4.19, 4.25.
15 WINN & WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE, § 20.05 (4th edn, Aspen Publishers,
Inc., 2007); See generally George L. Paul, The
‘Authenticity Crisis’ in Real Evidence, 15 Prac.
Litigator No. 6 (2004) at 212-13.
There are two primary proof hurdles for authenticating digital
documents — authenticity (origin and integrity) and reliability.
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by a reliable or trustworthy source to assure the
continuing accuracy and integrity of the originally
created record.16 Thus identity, integrity, and time,
recognized as the three main components of
authenticity, must be implemented in a fashion that will
allow strong tests, or verifiable proof, in the future when
authentication is required as a prerequisite for
admissibility or should questions of authenticity arise.17
A successful argument to establish a foundation of
authenticity relies on a combination of extrinsic controls
such as application and system access controls and
audit logs, and intrinsic controls, such as encryption,
time stamping, and digital signatures.18 It should be
noted that arguing authenticity solely through the use
of extrinsic controls is complex and costly, and involves
establishing the reliability of several external controls to
the document systems and applications over time. On
the other hand, the use of intrinsic content-level
controls to prevent modification (such as encryption), to
prevent and log access and use (for example document
rights management),19 and to detect modification (by
the use of time stamps and digital signatures), provide a
strong argument for the foundation of authenticity that
does not depend on the reliability of external systems,
other than those required to apply the intrinsic controls.
Self-Authentication
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence and the evidence
rules of nearly every state, public documents under seal
are admitted without further proof.20 Specifically, FED.
R. EVID. 902(1) requires that documents under seal of a
public officer, including a judge, be treated as self-
authenticating. The drafters of the Federal Rules of
Evidence recognized that the risk of forgery is reduced
by the requirement of authentication by a public officer
who possesses and affixes a seal.21
Authentication of a document under seal involves the
inference of three items: (1) the public officer is who he
or she claims to be and is trusted; (2) the signature and
seal are genuine; and (3) the signature and seal were
affixed by the named public officer.22 The seal must be
kept under the exclusive possession and control of the
public officer and not be used by any unauthorized
person.23 Therefore, sole control over the seal is
required, whether in the manner of exclusive
possessory control with a physical seal or strong access
control in the case of an electronic seal.
Because an official act under seal is self-proving, both
paper and electronic documents with a completed
official certificate are rendered self-authenticating and
admissible in court on their face.24 The evidentiary
effect of self-authentication is to permit admissibility by
creating a rebuttable presumption of the authenticity of
the document.25 In addition to removing the need for a
testifying witness, self-authentication also shifts the
evidential burden to the opposing party of challenging
the authenticity of the document.26
Digital trust framework: The authoritative source
record 
“Authoritative source record” refers to the official
version issued by a reliable and mandated source, the
JUSTICE AND SHERIFF: PRACTICAL AND AUTHORITATIVE METHODS FOR THE ELECTRONIC ISSUANCE OF 
OFFICIALLY CERTIFIED DOCUMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
16 See In re Vinhnee, American Express Travel
Related Service Co. Inc. v. Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437
(9th Cir. B.A.P. 2005) (proponent failed to
authenticate computer generated business
records because of an inability to assure content
integrity from the time they were originally
created). See also, MASON, ELECTRONIC
EVIDENCE, at § 4.19 (“In essence, reliability is
associated with the degree of control exercised
over the procedures that permit the data to be
created.”).
17 GEORGE L. PAUL, FOUNDATIONS OF DIGITAL
EVIDENCE, at 36.
18 PAUL R. RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE LAW AND
PRACTICE (American Bar Association 2005) at 249-
256; note the difficulties with long-term
conservation of digital signatures, in Stefanie
Fischer-Dieskau and Daniel Wilke, ‘Electronically
signed documents: legal requirements and
measures for their long-term conservation’,
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law
Review, 3 (2006) 40 – 44.
19 STEPHEN MASON, ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN
LAW (Tottel 2nd edn, 2007) § 15.43 (PKI
infrastructure is useful for demonstrating the
integrity of a message and providing
confidentiality to a document).
20 The following state rules of evidence incorporate
in whole or in part FED R. EVID. 902 (1), (2), and
(8), rendering as self-authenticating a document
under a public officer’s seal of office: ALA. R. EVID.
902; ALASKA R. EVID. 902; ARIZ. R. EVID. 902;
ARK. R. EVID. 902; COLO. R. EVID. 902; DEL. UNIF.
R. EVID. 902; FLA. ANN. STAT. § 90.902(1)(a)
(acknowledgment act provision not included);
HAW. R. EVID. 902; IDAHO R. EVID. 902; IND. R.
EVID. 902; IOWA R. EVID. 90; KY. R. EVID. 5-902;
LA. CODE EVID. ANN. ART. 902; MA RULES: MA
GUIDE TO EVIDENCE , 902; ME. R. EVID. 902; MD.
R. 5-902; MICH. R. EVID. 902; MINN. R. EVID. 902;
MISS. R. EVID. 902 ; MONT. R. EVID 902; NEB.
REV. STAT. § 27-90; N.H. R. EVID. 902; N.J. R. EVID.
902; N.M. R. EVID. 902; N.C. GEN. STAT. §8C-9-
902; N.D. R. EVID. 902; OHIO R. EVID. 902; OKLA.
STAT. TIT. 12 § 2902; OR. R. EVID. 902; PA. R. EVID.
902; R.I. R. EVID. 902; S.C. R. EVID. 902; S.D. R.
EVID. 19-17-2 AND 19-17-9; TENN. R. EVID. 902;
TEX. R. EVID. 902; UTAH R. EVID. 902; VT. R. EVID.
902; WASH. R. EVID. 902; W.VA. R. EVID. 902 ;
WIS. STAT. § 909.02; WYO. R. EVID. 902. See also
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1451 and § 1452(f).
21 Advisory Committee Notes to FED. R. EVID. 902(2)
(1972 Proposed Rules). See also Karla J. Elliott,
The Notarial Seal – The Last Vestiges of Notaries
Past, 31 J. Marshall L. Rev. 903, at 908 (1998)
(“The embosser seal provides maximum
safeguards against forgery and fraud by providing
and obvious, tactile means by which to verify an
original document.”).
22 7 JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2161 (1978).
23 ALASKA STAT. § 44.50.064; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-
313(C)(1); ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-14-107(e); CAL.
GOV’T CODE § 8207; COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-55-
115; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3-94j(a); 29 DEL.
CODE § 4310(f); FLA. STAT. § 117.05[1](c); 5 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 312/7-107; MASS. GOV. EXEC.
ORDER NO. 455 5[c] (April 2004); MISS. ADMIN.
RULES § ; NEB. REV. STAT. § 64-113[1]; N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 14-12A-18(A); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-06-0;
57 PA.
24 See generally EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMACK
ON EVIDENCE § 228 (3rd edn, 1984).
25 EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMACK ON EVIDENCE
at 700; see also RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE LAW
AND PRACTICE, at 248, 249. 
26 FED. R. EVID. 301. In many states, the presumption
of due execution can be defeated only by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. For example,
see In Re: Adoption of X.J.A., 284 Kan. 853 (2007);
Thompson v. Shell Western E&P Inc., 607 So.2d
37, 40 (Miss. 1992); Dencer v. Erb, 142 N.J. Eq. 422,
426 (Ch. 1948); Chianese v. Meier, 285 A.D.2d 314,
320, 729 N.Y.S.2d 460, 466 (1st Dept 2001); Wayt
v. Urbigkit, 157 P.3d 1057, 1061 (Wy. 2007).
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reference, the single and only version of the truth,
irrespective of who controls the document.27
Specifically, an authoritative source record is an
information object irrespective of format that is:
a) Designated by a public officer as the official and the
only version of a fact or content being asserted.
b) Controlled and documented according to a clear
and auditable document rights management policy
governing access and use rights.
c) Demonstrably admissible in legal proceedings and
compliant with applicable regulations, with an
intrinsically derived chain of custody from the time
the authoritative source record is declared until its
final disposition (the chain of custody no longer
depends on external systems and parties).
d) Verifiable as to its source (for instance via a
validated digital certificate from the court clerk,
county recorder, or Secretary of State) and
authenticity (that it can be demonstrated to be what
it purported to be at the time the assertion or
attestation was made, an order executed or, more
generally, e-mail was sent, contract was signed,
report approved).
The persistent authenticity and control of an
authoritative source record is based on intrinsic
detective and preventive control mechanisms. A public
officer declares an authoritative source record by the
application of an intrinsic document-level mechanism
such as a digital signature, an electronic seal, or time
stamp. The authoritative source record is independent
of the file container in which it is preserved.28 The
declaration event, which is an important component of
the creation of an authoritative source record,
cryptographically binds the document to its metadata,
security and retention policies, trusted time, and source.
The authoritative source record is self-contained and
self-verifiable and does not depend on any external
system or application to determine its authenticity. This
assumes the technology behind the creation of the
record has been deemed reliable to a specific assurance
level by an independent and credible third party.
The application of any required confidentiality or
access and use restrictions is an intrinsic property of an
authoritative source record. The court’s document rights
management policy aims to ensure persistent
protection and control of the official act after it is
created. Most importantly, usage rights prevent those
individuals that have been granted rights of access from
performing functions that may pose a risk (such as
copying or printing). Access and usage rights are
dynamic and can be immediately revoked or changed by
the court at any time. This ensures that the generating
public officer or court can, at all times, provide continual
protection and dynamic content-level control and full
audibility, even while the document is under the logical
control of another individual or entity.
Official electronic signature: authoritative
signature 
“Caesar had his Brutus; Charles the First his Cromwell;
and George III may profit by their example”29
System-Controlled signature
Digitally signing court orders with a high assurance
digital certificate and time stamp has the effect of
establishing each record as a “reference” or
“authoritative source record” for relying parties.30 This
ensures the ability to test the authenticity and reliability
of the information that was intended to be the
equivalent of a paper “original.”31 Although the federal
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce
Act (“E-SIGN”) exempts court orders and filings from its
scope,32 the widely enacted Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act (“UETA”)33 grants broad legal
recognition, admissibility, and reciprocity to electronic
27 This is to be distinguished from the logic of a
unique ‘original’ in the paper context. Some legal
commentators consider the concept of an original
to be meaningless as applied to digital objects.
See MASON, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE, at § 4.09,
PAUL, FOUNDATIONS OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE, at 48,
and Steven W. Teppler, ‘Digital Data as Hearsay’,
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law
Review 6 (2009) 7 – 24, fn 18 at 9.
28 Note the comments of Nicholas Bohm pertaining
to challenges around linking information to a file
container when a detached signature is used
outside at trusted environment, ‘Watch what you
sign!’, Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature
Law Review, 3 (2006) 45 – 49.
29 JAMES M. ELSON, PATRICK HENRY IN HIS
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS AND IN THE WORDS OF
HIS CONTEMPORARIES (Warwick House
Publishers, 2007) at 55. Patrick Henry made this
statement in opposition to the Stamp Act on May
30, 1765 before the Virginia House of Burgesses.
30 PAUL, FOUNDATIONS OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE, at 56-
59; Jacques Francoeur, Master Information
Management and the Authoritative Source Record
Life-Cycle Management Methodology, at 7 (SAIC,
2009) available at http://www.saic.com/news/
resources.asp#.
31 Paul W. Grimm, Michael V. Ziccardi and Alexander
W. Major, Back to the Future: Lorraine v. Markel
American Insurance Co. and New Findings on the
Admissibility of Electronically Stored Information,
42 Akron L. Rev. 357 (2009) fn. 14 at pp 412-417.
32 Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act (“E-SIGN”) 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7001 and
following.
33 UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT (“UETA”) § 11
(National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws 1999). The UETA has been
adopted in every state and the District of Columbia
except Illinois, New York, and Washington.
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signatures including court orders and electronic filings
in both state and local federal courts.34 In addition,
UETA authorizes courts to specify the form of electronic
signatures to be used.35
Under UETA, authentication of the origin and contents
of a document to a particular individual is termed
“attribution”.36 While not requiring the use of any one
method to prove that an electronic signature is
attributable to a person or document, the UETA
importantly provides that attribution may be proved by
means of a security procedure.37 A certified official act
performed in the manner of a security procedure both
attributes the signature to the authorized person and
renders the document self-proving.38 As defined by
section 2(14) of UETA, a security procedure is:
A procedure employed for the purpose of verifying
that an electronic signature, record, or performance is
that of a specific person or for detecting changes or
errors in the information in an electronic record. The
term includes a procedure that requires the use of
algorithms or other codes, identifying words or
numbers, encryption, or callback or other
acknowledgment procedures.
Just as in the paper world, the signing act or
certification by an official authenticates document by
proving attribution of the electronic signature and
document to the authorized signatory.39
Case studies
District of Columbia United States District Court – 
Court Orders
On August 26, 2009 in Washington, D.C., the Honorable
John M. Facciola, Magistrate Judge for the U.S. District
Court in the District of Columbia, became the first
United States judge to digitally sign a judicial order.40
Since that first event, Judge Facciola has been digitally
signing official court orders. “The capability to sign
electronically an order or other document should create
in the people who see it an assurance that the
document was signed by the judge and eliminate
corrupt attempts to use forged, electronically created
documents for improper ends,” said Judge Facciola.41
The judicial use of digital signatures in signing court
orders signals a ground breaking opportunity for U.S.
courts which, despite the widespread use of electronic
filing systems, still require handwritten signatures by
judges on paper. The ability to implement reliable digital
signatures for court filings deals with this problem,
while providing the legal confidence necessary to rely
on documents that have been signed electronically.
Although the federal courts nationwide have made
great strides in enabling the e-filing of pleadings, in the
minds of many legal experts, they are overdue for a
reliable, end-to-end electronic process that includes
signing. In fact, otherwise efficient and cost-effective
processes break down from a security viewpoint when
paper-based signatures are required. Currently, in most
courts only a “/s/” or typed name is needed for an
electronic signature. “A fully electronic filing system --
that includes electronic [digital] signatures -- makes
sense for America’s courts,” Judge Facciola said. “This is
the next logical development in the transition from
paper to electronic filing.”42
To ensure judicial orders signed electronically are
reliable and resistant to fraud and manipulation, Judge
Facciola’s signing method relies upon on a high
34 UETA § 7 (“A record or signature may not be
denied legal effect or enforceability solely because
it is in electronic form.”), § 11 (“If a law requires a
signature or record to be notarized,
acknowledged, verified, or made under oath, the
requirement is satisfied if the electronic signature
of the person authorized to perform those acts,
together with all other information required to be
included by other applicable law, is attached to or
logically associated with the signature or
record.”), and § 13 (“In a proceeding, evidence of
a record or signature may not be excluded solely
because it is in electronic form.”). The three non-
UETA states similarly grant legal recognition and
reciprocity to electronic signatures: 5 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. § 175/5-110 and 5-130; 57-A of the New
York Consolidated Laws, Article III Electronic
Signatures and Records Act §§ 304 (2) and 306;
NYCRR 540.1 (e); and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
19.34.320 and 321 (digital signatures only).
35 UETA § 18.
36 UETA, note 34, at § 9(a) and Comment.
37 UETA, note 34, at § 9(a) and Comment.
38 UETA at § 2(14); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-351(9);
DANIEL J. GREENWOOD, ELECTRONIC
NOTARIZATION: WHY IT’S NEEDED, HOW IT
WORKS, AND HOW IT CAN BE IMPLEMENTED TO
ENABLE GREATER TRANSACTIONAL SECURITY at
10 (National Notary Association 2006) available at
http://www.nationalnotary.org/commission; Paul,
FOUNDATIONS OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE, at 212. The
three states that have not enacted the UETA also
recognize attribution by security procedure: 5 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 175/10-110(b) (authentication
by security procedure expressly incorporated); 9
NYCRR 540.5(d) (procedures by government
entities and public officers required for ensuring
authenticity and integrity of records); and WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 19.34.340 (authentication by
digital signature).
39 UETA at § 2(14); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-351(9);
DANIEL J. GREENWOOD, ELECTRONIC
NOTARIZATION: WHY IT’S NEEDED, HOW IT
WORKS, AND HOW IT CAN BE IMPLEMENTED TO
ENABLE GREATER TRANSACTIONAL SECURITY at
10 (National Notary Association 2006) 
40 Timothy Reiniger and Jacques Francoeur, Federal
Magistrate Sets Example for Digitally Signed
Official Court Orders, EDDE Journal (Newsletter of
the ABA Section Science & Technology Law)
Volume 1 Issue 1 (Winter 2010), 14.
41 Timothy Reiniger and Jacques Francoeur, Federal
Magistrate Sets Example for Digitally Signed
Official Court Orders, EDDE Journal (Newsletter of
the ABA Section Science & Technology Law)
Volume 1 Issue 1 (Winter 2010), 13.
42 Timothy Reiniger and Jacques Francoeur, Federal
Magistrate Sets Example for Digitally Signed
Official Court Orders, EDDE Journal (Newsletter of
the ABA Section Science & Technology Law)
Volume 1 Issue 1 (Winter 2010), 14.
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assurance signing credential and process43 comprising
of a secure storage device containing the private key
over which Judge Facciola has sole control by means of
a two factor authentication process; a digital certificate
based on strong in person identity vetting; a trusted
time stamp from an accredited source; and a signing
and rendering (viewing) application that provides any
relying party with the ability to easily verify the
authenticity of the order.44 The judge’s signing
credential is issued and secured in accordance with an
assurance level equivalent or greater to what the United
States federal authorities refer to as Medium Assurance
Hardware -- Federal Bridge Cross Certified.45 That
certification level is based on a high standard of
reliability defined by the Federal PKI Management
Authority.
A critical prerequisite before any digitally signed
record should be relied upon is the verification of its
authenticity. This is achieved by validating the digital
signature which is accomplished by most applications
by simply opening the document. The important
validation questions are: whether the document has
changed since it was signed, when was it signed, and
whether it was signed by the person indicated in the
digital certificate. Unfortunately, the process of reaching
a judgment on the authenticity of a digitally signed
document is still complex, because it is in part based on
making a judgment on whether the digital certificate of
the signatory was reliable at the time of signing. This is
achieved by verifying the status of the digital certificate
at the time of signing.46 In order to make it easy for
relying parties to validate a digital signature, the
objective should ideally be that they do not need to
know anything [e.g., about PKI] or do anything such as
make configuration changes to their signing application
or make any judgments about whether to trust the
certificate and its source.
For validation to be automatic, critical information
relating to the trust to be given to the document must
already be included in the signature itself and the
application in which the document is created, which is
beyond the scope of this article.47 It is possible to
achieve this by using the current improvements of the
most recent versions of the relevant application (for
instance, Adobe). Ideally, the signature validation
process should simply involve two steps – opening the
document and looking for the “valid” indication icon
that states the document is authentic (normally a green
check mark). Any actions beyond this are more than the
relying party should be expected to do. This assumes
that the operational reliability of the issuing Certificate
Authority can be determined and meets a specific
assurance level. The reliability of the Certificate
Authority is in part defined by its governing Certificate
Policy or Certificate Practice Statement and independent
third party audit assessments.48 In the case of Judge
Facciola, this trust level issue was established through
the issuance of a Medium Assurance Hardware Federal
Bridge Cross Certified signing credential, which has a
prescribed and verified high level of assurance designed
to mitigate forgery.
Minnesota e-Charging service
In March 2009, the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension launched an e-Charging Service pilot
43 Jacques Francoeur and Ed Chase, Digital Assurance
and the Digital Chain of Evidence, at 4 (SAIC and
Adobe, 2008) (describing a reference architecture
that measures the level of reliability of a digitally
signed record) available at http://www.saic.com/
news/resources.asp#.
44 MASON, ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN LAW, at §
15.38 (“A digital signature can provide for the
authenticity of information.”).
45 Appropriate uses for relying parties are described
in the X.509 Certificate Policy for the Federal
Bridge Certification Authority (Version 2.17 June
10, 2010) Section 1.4.1, available at
http://www.idmanagement.gov/fpkipa/documents
/FBCA_CP_RFC3647.pdf – “This level is relevant to
environments where threats to data are high or
the consequences of the failure of security services
are high. This may include very high value
transactions or high levels of fraud risk.” The
introductory text to paragraph 1.4.1 provides that
“Relying Parties must evaluate the environment
and the associated threats and vulnerabilities and
determine the level of risk they are willing to
accept based on the sensitivity or significance of
the information. This evaluation is done by each
Relying Party for its application and is not
controlled by this CP.” In addition, paragraph 1.3.6
in relation to Relying Parties, states in part: “A
Relying Party uses a Subscriber’s certificate to
verify the integrity of a digitally signed message,
to identify the creator of a message, or to
establish confidential communications with the
Subscriber. The Relying Party is responsible for
deciding whether or how to check the validity of
the certificate by checking the appropriate
certificate status information. A Relying Party may
use information in the certificate (such as
certificate policy identifiers) to determine the
suitability of the certificate for a particular use.”
46 See ABA INFORMATION SECURITY COMMITTEE,
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SECTION: DIGITAL
SIGNATURE GUIDELINES (American Bar
Association, 1996) at 14-15 and sections 1.8, 1.22,
1.29, 1.36, and 1.37. the certificate status
information is included in the digital signature as
either 1) a time stamped Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) which indicates indirectly that the certificate
of the signatory was not revoked prior to the time
the signature was created or 2) an Online
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) response which
checks the actual validity status of the signatory’s
certificate.
47 Jacques Francoeur and Ed Chase, Digital Assurance
and the Digital Chain of Evidence, at § 3
(providing a neutral technical description of these
requirements).
48 Note the explanation provided by the Federal
Bridge Certification Authority, available at
http://www.idmanagement.gov/fpkia/crosscert.cf
m: “When a PKI cross-certifies with the Federal PKI
Architecture, and is an affiliate in good standing, a
Relying Party operating an online application that
utilizes digital certificates for electronic identity
authentication may choose to trust that PKI's
digital certificates at the Level(s) of Assurance
asserted by those certificates. No other trust
requirements are needed for the Relying Party to
make that determination.”
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49 The story is available at
http://www.govtech.com/gt/695238.
50 MINN. R. CRIM. P. 1.06.
51 The story is available at
http://www.govtech.com/gt/articles/641095.
52 Code of Virginia, Title 7.1, Chapter 4, Section 7.1-
26. Motto of the Commonwealth of Virginia
attributed to Brutus upon slaying Caesar.
53 For instance, see Eveleigh v. Conness, 933 P.2d
675, 682 (Kan. 1997) (“[P]resumption that a public
officer has performed the duties of his or her office
faithfully”); Gombach v. Department of State, 692
A.2d 1127, 1132 (Pa. Commonw. Ct. 1997) (“[A]
notary commission notifies the public that the
Commonwealth believes the notary can be trusted
properly.”); In re Medlin, 201 B.R. 188, 192 (E.D.
Tenn. 1996) (“[P]resumption that sworn public
officers have properly executed their duties absent
evidence to the contrary.”).
54 By statutory means, the following states presume
the official character of the notary and the lawful
performance of the duties: ALASKA STAT. §
09.63.060; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-502(A); CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1453(c) and § 1452(f) (notary’s
signature and seal presumed genuine); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 12-55-204(1); 29 DEL. CODE §
4323(c); D.C. CODE ANN. § 42-143(c); GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-10-113; 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §
30/3(a); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-37-1-5; KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 53-504; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4 §
1012(1); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 565.263(1); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 358.43(c); MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-5-
604(4); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 240.1635(3); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 456-B:3 III; N.M. STAT. ANN. §
14-14-3(C); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 10B-99(a) (notarial
acts are given a presumption of regularity); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 47-19-14.2(1); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
§ 49-114(C); OR. REV. STAT. § 194.525(3); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 25-1-630(E); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
118.2(a); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.44.080(9);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 39-1A-2(a); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
706.07(3)(c).
55 Osborn v. Kemp, (Del. Ch. 8-20-2009) (the mere
signature and seal of a notary public does not give
rise to a presumption of genuineness to a
photocopy).
56 For instance, see CAL. EVID. CODE § 1451 (a
certificate of acknowledgment or proof of a writing
other than a will is prima facie evidence of the
facts recited in the certificate and the signatures
contained in the underlying document); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 38-35-101(2) (prima facie evidence of
proper execution of deed); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-
21-9-2 and § 33-42-2-6 (certificate under seal is
prima facie evidence of due execution); LA. CIV.
CODE PROC. ART. 1836 (prima facie proof of due
execution); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 55.307(1); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 490.410 (prima facie evidence of due
execution of deed); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:82-17
(prima facie evidence of due execution); N.Y.
CONS. LAWS § 137 Exec. (presumptive evidence of
facts in certificate); 21 P. S. § 46 (certificate under
seal is presumptive evidence of facts in
certificate); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-25-7 ( 2006)
(prima facie evidence of due execution); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 64.08.050 (certificate under
seal is prima facie evidence of due execution);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.01(4)(c) (presumptive
evidence facts in certificate); and WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 32-1-104(a) (presumptive evidence of facts in
certificate). See also, UTAH CODE ANN. § 69-1-4 (
2006) and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.52.050
(electronically transmitted instrument under seal
is prima facie proof of due execution of the
original). See also, Briggs v. Glass, 420 So.2d 46,
47 (Ala. 1982); Fares v. Morrison, 54 Cal.App.2d
773, 775 (1942); Westmoreland v. Tallent, 274 Ga.
172, 174 (2001); Curtis v. Curtis, 75 N.E.2d 881 (Ill.
1949); Valeriano-Cruz v. Neth, 14 Neb.App. 855,
861 (2006); Smith v. Smith, 44 A.D.3d 1081 (NY 3d
Dept 2007); Limor v. Fleet Mortgage Group (In re
Marsh), 12 S.W.3d 449, 453 (Tenn. 2000);
Goodman v. Wachovia, 260 S.W.3d 699 (Tex.
App.5th 2008) (acknowledgment proves or verifies
identity of the signer); and Mortgage Associates,
Inc. v. Hendricks, 51 Wis.2d 579 (1971).
program in St. Louis County for electronically preparing,
signing, filing, and approving all criminal charging
documents.49 On June 30, 2010, the Minnesota Supreme
Court approved the program for state-wide
implementation with adoption of enabling amendments
to the criminal procedure rules.50 Criminal charging
documents are now being signed, notarized, and filed
electronically and in real time. Using the Minnesota
Criminal Justice Data Network, system controlled digital
signatures are used by the police officer, the notary
(before whom the police officer signs the charging
document under oath), the prosecutor, and the judge.
The eCharging Service has resulted in an increase in the
accuracy of entering the date entry, a reduction in lost
police officer time spent traveling great distances to
court, and a reduction in delays in holding individuals
pending the decision to file a complaint and then
obtaining approval from the court.
Illinois Orders of Protection
Since 2006, the Kane County Circuit Court in Illinois has
been electronically processing and issuing domestic
restraining orders or “Orders of Protection.”51 Utilizing
the ease of use of the web and automated routing, a
request for an order of protection can be initiated
electronically by representatives of domestic violence
victims, court personnel, attorneys, or victims
themselves at one of four locations – the courthouse,
the clerk’s office, the sheriff’s office, or a domestic
victim’s shelter. Regardless of who originates the order
request, the forms then need to be acted upon by a
judge, court clerk, and sheriff, all of whom sign with a
digital signature. The clerk electronically certifies and
stamps the finalized orders with a device controlled by
the system before sending the orders to the sheriff.
Because of the automated process, an order signed by a
judge is instantly received by the sheriff’s office. The
Kane County Circuit Court has experienced a five-fold
reduction in the time it takes to submit and process
restraining orders.
Official electronic certificate: reliable record 
“Sic semper tyrannis”52
Document integrity
As public officers, the official acts and certificates of
judges and court clerks enjoy an evidentiary
presumption of having been validly performed.53
Accordingly, in the absence of rebuttal evidence, the
official certificate or signature is self-proving, and the
document is received into evidence without further
proof of the official’s authority or seal.54 However, the
certificate is not effective unless the signature and seal
of the official are affixed.55 The certificate, to which the
official’s signature and seal are affixed, provides prima
facie or presumptive evidence of all attested facts
including the identity and attribution of the principal.56
With a quasi-judicial or notarial act, successful rebuttal
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requires clear and convincing evidence by a
disinterested witness of lack of physical appearance,
failure to verify identify of the signer, or fraud.57
An international e-document authenticity standard
has emerged for an electronic public document that
reflects the evidentiary need for electronic documents to
have the capability of testing the authenticity of the
document.58 This standard requires that any relying
party be able to verify the origin and integrity of the
electronic public document.59 Establishing the
authenticity of an electronic judicial order thus requires
the capability, in perpetuity, of independently
authenticating the origin of the document, and verifying
whether the content of the electronic document is
complete and unaltered. When the electronic official
certification process is performed in the manner of a
security procedure, by incorporating encryption or
similar technology, subsequent changes to the
electronic signatures and document can be detected.60
Case studies
Virginia Circuit Court Clerks61
Effective July, 2010, circuit court clerks in Virginia, who
already had court e-filing and land title e-recording
capabilities, may now issue official certificates and
certified records electronically of any document
maintained by the clerk. This marks the first time the
circuit court clerks will be sending electronic official
documents outside the court system’s managed
environment. In addition, the circuit court clerks may
specify the security procedures, as defined by UETA
2(14), for attorneys to electronically file signed or
notarized documents.62 For an officially certified
electronic document, the circuit court clerks use a
digital signature and seal to enable detection of
subsequent unauthorized alterations. Intrinsic
document-level controls are required to enable dynamic
and constant security of the document outside of the
managed environment.63
Secretaries of State – Certificates of Authority
When a document executed in one jurisdiction is to be
submitted in a court or office of another state or foreign
jurisdiction, certification of the notary’s identity and
official status with a Certificate of Authority or an
apostille may be required as a prerequisite for that
document to be recognized or received into evidence in
the other court or office.64 State, county, and judicial
officials have the legal obligation, when requested, to
verify the authority of a notarial officer.
Standards for electronic Certificates of Authority have
been established by the National Association of
Secretaries of State (“NASS”). To maintain functional
equivalence with certified public documents, including
notarized documents, NASS has determined that
certified electronic public documents and notarizations
must meet certain basic requirements to ensure non-
repudiation: the fact of the issuance of the certification
must be independently verifiable and the certification
must be invalidated if the underlying document is
improperly modified.65 Virginia and Delaware have
enacted laws requiring that their respective Secretaries
of State issue electronic certifications and apostilles
under the secure electronic seal of the state.66 The
source of the document (the secretary of state’s office),
as reflected in the secretary’s electronic signature and
seal, must be capable of independent verification and
the certificate must be invalidated if the underlying
document is modified.
Kansas Secretary of State – Electronic Apostille Program 
To effectuate legal recognition of notarized documents
57 For instance, see Colburn v. Mid-State Homes, Inc.,
266 So.2d 865 (Ala. 1972) (the acknowledgment is
conclusive of the facts therein absent proof of
fraud or duress); Witt v. Panek, 97 N.E.2d 283, 285
(Ill. 1951) (“the certificate of acknowledgment can
be overcome only by proof which is clear,
convincing and satisfactory, and by disinterested
witnesses”); Waitt Bros. Land, Inc. v. Montange,
257 N.W.2d 516 (Iowa 1977); Jensen v. Skibiski, 28
So.2d 328 (Fl. 1947) (being a quasi-judicial act, the
acknowledgment is conclusive of the facts therein
absent proof of fraud or duress); Murdock v.
Nelms, 212 Va. 639, 641 (1972) (the
acknowledgment is a judicial act that imparts
absolute verity and cannot be impeached except
for fraud); Evans v. Bottomlee, 148 S.E.2d 712 (WV
1966) (being a quasi-judicial act, the
acknowledgment is conclusive and cannot be
impeached except for clear and satisfactory proof
of fraud or collusion).
58 FIRST INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON E-
NOTARIZATION AND E-APOSTILLES, Conclusions
15 and 18 (National Notary Association 2005)
available at http://www.e-app.info/.
59 FIRST INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON E-
NOTARIZATION AND E-APOSTILLES, Conclusions
15 and 18 (National Notary Association 2005); see
also NATIONAL E-NOTARIZATION STANDARDS,
NATIONAL E-NOTARIZATION STANDARD (National
Association of Secretaries of State 2006)
Standards 14 and 15, available at
http://www.nationalnotary.org/commission.
60 ABA SUBCOMMITTEE ON ETRUST: ENW
WHITEPAPER ON ENOTARIZATION at 3.3 (American
Bar Association 2006) available at
http://www.nationalnotary.org/commission.
(“[T]he document being proffered must contain or
be accompanied by evidence that it has not
changed since it was first generated in its final
form (see Section 12, UETA), or if it has changed,
what those changes were and their significance, if
any.”).
61 VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-258.3:2.
62 VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-258.3.
63 VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-496(3).
64 Keith D. Sherry, Comment, Old Treaties Never Die,
They Just Lose Their Teeth: Authentication Needs
of a Global Community Demand Retirement of the
Hague Public Documents Convention, 31 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1045-1083 (1998).
65 NATIONAL E-NOTARIZATION STANDARDS,
Standard 13.
66 VA. CODE ANN. § 47.1-11.1(A) and 29 DEL. CODE §
4329 (a).
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that cross national borders, The Hague Conference on
Private International Law (the “Hague Conference”)
oversees the Convention Abolishing the Requirement of
Legalization for Foreign Public Documents (the
“Convention”). The Hague Conference has determined
that the spirit and letter of the Convention do not pose
an obstacle to use of technology, and that the
interpretation of the Convention in the light of functional
equivalence permits competent authorities to issue
electronic apostilles.67 The Hague Conference
encourages all competent authorities to issue e-
apostilles.68
Under the auspices of the Electronic Apostille Pilot
Program (e-APP) between the Hague Conference on
Private International Law and the National Notary
Association (USA), on February 15, 2007, the Kansas
Secretary of State became the first competent authority
in the United States join the e-APP and issue e-
apostilles attached to electronically notarized
documents.69 The Secretary uses a digital certificate to
affix the official digital signature and seal. For e-
apostilles and electronically notarized documents, the
Hague Conference has determined that electronic
apostilles and notarial acts must ensure non-
repudiation. Accordingly, the fact of issuance of an
electronic public document, apostille, or notarial
certificate must be independently verifiable and be
invalidated if improperly modified.70 These requirements
do not mandate the use of a particular technology.71
Official electronic seal: trusted source 
“Ense petit placidam sub libertate quietem”72
Document level control
The seal is a particular sign or written mark made to
attest the formal execution of a document.73
Information contained in the seal identifies the
individual as a duly appointed public officer imbued
with authority to perform official acts.74 The seal
authenticates or attributes the official act as the act of a
notary.75 The seal appears in one of four forms: 1)
impressed or embossed sign, 2) imprinted or stamped
sign, and 3) handwritten (scrolled) or typed mark, and
4) electronic image.76
By attaching the seal information to an electronic
document in a manner that enables an independent
verification of the officer, and provides a mechanism to
demonstrate whether the document has been tampered
with, the evidentiary function of rendering documents
self-authenticating is preserved.77 While physically
67 FIRST INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON E-
NOTARIZATION AND E-APOSTILLES, fn. 51,
Conclusion 1.
68 FIRST INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON E-
NOTARIZATION AND E-APOSTILLES, Conclusion 13.
69 For more information about the e-APP, see
Christophe Bernasconi and Rich Hansberger,
“Electronic Apostille Pilot Program (e-APP):
memorandum on some of the technical aspects
underlying the suggested model for the issuance
of electronic apostilles (e-apostilles)” available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/genaff_pd18e20
07.pdf.
70 FIRST INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON E-
NOTARIZATION AND E-APOSTILLES, Conclusions
15 and 18.
71 FIRST INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON E-
NOTARIZATION AND E-APOSTILLES, Conclusions
16 and 19.
72 Massachusetts General Laws, Part 1, Title 1,
Chapter 2, Section 1. Motto of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts contained in state seal based on
the writing of Algernon Sidney, who Charles II
executed in 1683.
73 See CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1930;
MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-4-201; OR. REV. STAT. §
42.110; Van Den Borre v. State, 596 So.2d 687, 691
(Fla. App. 4. Dist. 1992); and King v. Guynes, 42
So. 959,960 (La. 1907) (“The purpose of a ‘seal’ is
to attest in a formal manner to the execution of an
instrument.”). See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(West 1979) at 1210.
74 “The seal ensures that the Notary’s credentials
are present and legible,” Douglas M. Fischer, The
Seal: Symbol of Security, NATIONAL NOTARY
MAGAZINE, November 1995, at 12.
75 ALA. CODE § 36-20-4; ALASKA STAT. §
44.50.062(5); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-313(C)(3); CAL.
GOV’T CODE § 8207; D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1204;
FLA. STAT. § 95.03; GA. CODE ANN. § 45-17-6;
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 456-3; 5 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. § 312/3-101; IND. CODE ANN. § 33-42-2-4(b)
(“All notarial acts not attested by a seal as
described in subsection (a) are void”); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 53-105; MD. CODE ANN. STATE GOV’T. §
18-108(a); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 59, § 31; MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 359.03 SUBDIV. 1; MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 25-33-3 (“[A]nd his official acts shall be attested
by his seal of office”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 64-210;
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 240.040; N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-12A-18(B); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-02-05; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 49, § 5; OR. REV. STAT. § 194.152 (a
document without an imprint of the official seal of
the notary shall be of no effect); 57 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 158; TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-22-110
(acknowledgment without a seal is void); TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 406.013(a); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 69-1-4; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 65.52.050;
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 137.01(4)(b) WYO. STAT. ANN. §
32-1-106(a).
76 See CORBIN, CONTRACTS §3241 (one volume edn,
1952) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 96 cmt. a (1981). Note that the legal
construct of the official seal may also be denoted
according to the device used to affix or attach the
seal’s image. An example of this is found in the
Revised Uniform Law on Notarial Acts as approved
by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws on July 16, 2010 § 2(8)
available at http://www.nccusl.org (“Official
stamp” means a physical image affixed to or
embossed on a tangible record or an electronic
image attached to or logically associated with an
electronic record.”).  See also, MINN. STAT. ANN. §
359.03 SUBDIV. 2 (b) (“The official notarial stamp
required by this section, whether applied to the
record physically or electronically, is deemed to be
a ‘seal’ for purposes of the admission of a
document in court.”).
77 NATIONAL E-NOTARIZATION STANDARDS, “Form
and Manner of Performing the Electronic Notarial
Act,” Comment (“Although UETA, URPERA, and the
federal E-SIGN law can be read to have eliminated
the need for a physical seal image as a
requirement for determining whether an electronic
document is an ‘original’ versus a copy, the seal
requirement remains essential to authenticating
documents under federal and state rules of
evidence.”). See also, H.R. 3808, 111th Cong., 2d
Sess.,  111 CONG. REC. S7558 (2010) (“Each court
that operates under the jurisdiction of a State shall
recognize any lawful notarization made by a
notary public licensed or commissioned under the
laws of a State other than the State where the
court is located if…in the case of an electronic
record, the seal information is securely attached
to, or logically associated with, the electronic
record so as to render the record tamper-
resistant”) available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c111:H.R.3808:. For additional
legislative background on H.R. 3808, see Hearing
on H.R. 1458 Before the Subcommittee on Courts,
the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 2d
Sess., 4-8 (2006) (testimony of Timothy Reiniger)
available at commdocs.house.gov/committees/
...000/hju26412_0f.htm.
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78 ABA SUBCOMMITTEE ON ETRUST:
ENOTARIZATION, at 1.0.
79 Lorraine v. Markel American Life Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D.
534 (D. Md. 2007) (recognizing that electronically
stored information is subject to self-authentication
under Rule 902 in its entirety). See also, Paul W.
Grimm, Michael V. Ziccardi and Alexander W.
Major, Back to the Future: Lorraine v. Markel
American Insurance Co. and New Findings on the
Admissibility of Electronically Stored Information,
42 Akron L. Rev. 357 (2009) at 384 (observing that
courts and attorneys have been surprisingly slow
to use Rule 902 when authenticating online
records); note the comments of Brian W. Esler,
‘Lorraine v. Markel: unnecessarily raising the
standard for admissibility of electronic evidence’,
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law
Review, 4 (2007) 80 – 82.
80 Paul, FOUNDATIONS OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE, at 211-
212.
81 NATIONAL E-NOTARIZATION STANDARDS,
Standards 5 through to 11.
82 NATIONAL E-NOTARIZATION STANDARDS,
Standard 13 (National Association of Secretaries of
State 2006). The American Bar Association defines
the term “non-repudiation” as “[s]trong and
substantial evidence of the identity of the signer
of a message and of message integrity, sufficient
to prevent a party from successfully denying the
origin, submission or delivery of the message and
the integrity of its contents.” DIGITAL SIGNATURE
GUIDELINES § 1.20 (American Bar Association
1996); note the discussion of ‘non-repudiation’ in
MASON, ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN LAW, at §
14.20.
83 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 606-3(a).
84 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 606-3(b).
85 VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-258.4 (C).
86 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-1611(b).
87 KAN. ADMIN. REG. § 7-43-1(c) and § 7-43-2(c).
Similarly, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
requires notaries to use state-approved digital
certificates to fulfill the electronic notary seal
requirement. See 35 PA. B. 7068 (December 31,
2005) available at
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-
53/2416.html.
88 29 DEL. C. § 4322 (f).
affixing the imprint or impress of the paper seal image
does not apply to an electronic document, the
information concerning the seal, including an image,
nevertheless must be contained in the signature or the
content of the document.78 E-SIGN and the UETA defer
to other state laws and regulations for direction on how
the notary’s electronic signature and seal information is
to be attached to or contained in a document.
Case studies
DC Federal Court – Court Orders
This marks the first time a United States federal judge
has adopted a process for issuing self-authenticating
official documents in digital form.79 Signed judicial
orders and other official court certifications created
from a high-assurance signing credential with a tamper-
evident court seal image are self-proving, thus
rendering the attached contents self-authenticating
under Rule 902 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.80
Judge Facciola’s approach of including an intrinsic
detective control in the document permits relying
parties to test the document’s origin, integrity of
contents, and date and time of issuance without any
need for extrinsic evidence. No external evidence is
necessary because all the validation evidence, such as
the validity status of the digital certificate at the time of
signing, is included in the digital signature itself. Such a
self-contained signature does not depend on external
information to determine authenticity. After the
validation establishes that the document is authentic,
how the information is used depends on the relying
party and the use to which the document is put.
Judge Facciola’s manner of enabling self-
authentication with respect to public documents is
consistent with emerging laws and standards in the U.S.
for officially certified electronic documents, including
electronic notarization. The National e-Notarization
Standards, issued by NASS, require an electronic
notarization to give relying parties the ability to
independently verify the notary and detect alterations to
the signatures and document.81 Laws reflecting this
requirement have recently been enacted in Delaware,
Florida, and Virginia. This standard reflects the need for
a notarial act, like a judicial act, to be self-proving and
to provide the capability of document authenticity
testing and non-repudiation.82
State Court Clerks
To authenticate official acts and certifications in
electronic form, court clerks in Hawaii must use an
electronic seal that is “electronically imprinted” and is
controlled by the clerk.83 The certificate must also
include an electronic image of the “electronic facsimile
signature.”84 With effect from July 2010, every judge and
circuit court clerk in Virginia must attach a secure
electronic seal when signing or certifying an electronic
document.85 “Official electronic seal” is defined as “an
electronic image of a seal or stamp, respectively, of the
court or clerk, which is produced by software
applications authorized by the clerk that are protected
by system credentials to which only the clerk or persons
authorized by the clerk have access.” This authorizes
judges and circuit court clerks to apply controls to a
document that prevent changes being made without
reference to the judge or clerk, thus enhancing the
assertion of authenticity.
E-Notarization – Governmental Trusted Source for Seal 
The Kansas legislature specifically authorized the
Secretary of State to promulgate rules and regulations
establishing procedures for an electronic notarization.86
The rules, published with effect from December 30,
2005, require notaries to perform electronic notarial
acts using only state-provided digital certificates.87
Delaware law now requires the electronic notarial act
to be performed in the manner of a security procedure.88
Specifically, the act must be independently verifiable
and prevent subsequent alterations to the notarial
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certificate and the underlying document. The Secretary
of State requires notaries to use a state-issued digital
certificate placed on a smart card. The performance of
the electronic notarial act is protected by a two factor
sole control authentication: the smart card (something
you have) and a pass code (something you know) only
known by the signatory. A unique aspect of the law is
that it has extraterritorial reach throughout the United
States.89 Electronic notarial acts may be performed
anywhere in the country, providing the notary is
sponsored by a regulated industry, including banks, law
offices, and title companies. Federal employees may
also qualify.90
For court e-filing purposes, Wisconsin requires
notaries to only use electronic signatures and seals
issued by the court.91 The electronic signing credentials
and seals are confidential and must remain under the
notary’s exclusive control. Consistent with the common
law trust framework for paper documents, the digital
signature and seal from the electronic filing system
satisfy the self-authentication provisions.92
The Electronic Seal or Trustmark: logical
extension of common law trust framework 
“Sigillum est cera impressa; quia cera, sine impressione
non est sigillum.”93
The creation of an authoritative source record produced
through 1) the application of a digital seal or trustmark
as the intrinsic detective control and 2) the application
of a rights management policy as the intrinsic protective
control, allows a court to provide its relying parties with
a self verifying authentication method and to constantly
dictate who has access to the authoritative source
record, when it may be viewed or when it expires, and
what may or may not be done with the record. Thus the
information can be transmitted across the internet
without the risk of modification or unauthorized access.
Officially certified electronic documents generated
with “detective controls” (mechanisms to detect but not
prevent unauthorized alterations) such as digital
signatures, trustmarks, or trusted time stamps offer
several benefits — for example, the ability to verify the
source and authenticity of the document, the ability to
prove that the document is what it purported to be from
the time the assertion was made (that is, when the
order was signed, the court record was attested, the
contract was executed, or the approval was given), the
ability to preserve relevant evidence such as access and
usage activity and intrinsically derived chain of custody,
and the ability to authenticate the document under the
Federal Rules of Evidence without requiring that the
organization’s information management systems be
demonstrated to be reliable, except those involved in
the application of the detective controls such as digital
signatures and preventive controls (mechanisms to
prevent unauthorized access) such as encryption and
document rights management technology.
Officially certified electronic documents generated
with intrinsic document-level “preventive controls”
measurably reduce the risks related to unintended
disclosure or unauthorized access, since even if these
undesirable events occur, the information remains
protected and under control. These preventive controls
are also dynamic in that access and usage rights that
are initially granted can be changed over time and with
immediate effect. In addition, access to the most current
document can be ensured even if outdated versions
have already been distributed. Methods in the United
States for issuing officially certified electronic
documents and judicial orders or, as referred to in this
article, as authoritative source records, integrate both
detective and preventive control technologies to enable
official electronic documents to have persistent and
dynamic content level protection and control
irrespective of where they are located or under whose
control they are.
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91 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 801.17 (11)(b).
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93 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 96
cmt. a (1981). Common law legal principle
developed by Lord Coke and quoted in Pierce v.
Indseth, 106 U.S. 546, 549 (1882).
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